Abstract. Attribute based signature (ABS) is a novel cryptographic primitive, which enables a party can sign messages for any predicate satisfy by their attributes. However, heavy computational cost is required during the verification procedure in most existing ABS schemes, which may needs many pairing operations. Pairing are costly operation when compared to exponentiation in the base group. As a result, this presents a greatly challenge for resource-limited users, such as smart cards and wireless sensor. In other words, verification can hardly be done in these devices if attribute based signature is employed. We solve this problem by proposing a new notion called Attribute-Based Server-Aided Verification Signature. It is similar to normal ABS scheme, but it further enables the verifier to verify the signature with the assistance of an external server. In this paper, we provide the security definition of AttributeBased Server-Aided Verification Signature, and design a concrete serveraided verification protocol for Li et al.'s attribute based signature. We also prove that our protocol is secure with random oracles.
Introduction
Attribute based signature (ABS) is a novel cryptographic primitive, which extends the identity based signatures in which a signer is defined by a set of attributes instead of a single string representing the signer's identity. In ABS, a user obtains his attribute secret key for a set of attributes from an attribute authority, with which they can later sign message for any predicate satisfied by their attributes. If the signature is valid, then the verifier will be convinced that the signer's attributes satisfy the signing predicate while remaining completely ignorant of the identity of signer. ABS has found many important applications [1] , such as private access control, anonymous credential, trust negotiations, distributed access control, attribute based messaging, etc.
However, one of the main efficiency drawbacks of ABS is that the verification procedure requires heavy computational cost. Some existing ABS schemes [2, 1, 3] , a large number of pairings are needed in verification, which commonly grows linearly with the size of predicate formula. Pairings are costly operation when compared to the exponentiation in the base group -when pairings are used on an elliptic curve defined over a field of q elements, the last operation of the pairing is an exponentiation in a field of q k elements, where k is the embedding degree of the elliptic curve, which computational cost is much more heavy than an exponentiation on the elliptic curve. Although some researchers [4] have dramatically reduced the computational cost of pairings, their technique requires the simultaneous computation of many pairings, which may not be suitable for the memory restrict devices. Recently, Herranz et al. [5] and Gagné et al. [6] propose the short pairing-efficient ABS schemes. However, both of their schemes are very inefficient in the signing algorithm.
In this paper, we introduce a new notion called Attribute-Based Server-Aided Verification Signature (ABSAVS). There is no difference between an ABS and ABSAVS in the signing process. On the other side, there is an additional server which helps the verifier to verify the signature. While the verifier received a ABS signature, he computes a transformed signature, which contains the information that should be initialized, and sends it to the server. It generates a token after executing most of pairing computations and sends the token back to the verifier. Finally the verifier verifies the signature from this token, with lightweight computational cost.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we firstly analysis Li et al.'s outsourced verification scheme [7] , and show that it can be forged by collusion between untrusted server and outside attacker [8] . Then, we propose a security definition of Attribute-Based ServerAided Verification Signature (ABSAVS), and design a concrete ABSAVS scheme from Li et al.'s ABS scheme [2] . We employ the Lagrange interpolation formula in this protocol. With the help of the server, the number of pairing involving in verification is greatly reduced from O(|Ω * |) to 2 (These two pairings also can be pre-computed offline.), Ω * is the attribute set in the threshold predicate included in the signature.
Related Work
Attribute based signature: The first normal definition of ABS was presented Maji et al. [9] , but the security of their scheme is based on the generic group model. Li et al. [2] and Shahandashit et al. [1] proposed the ABS schemes that support threshold predicate in standard model. Nevertheless, both of their schemes require O(|Ω * |) pairings in verification, where Ω * is the attribute set in the threshold predicate included in the signature. In 2011, Escala et al. [3] presented an ABS scheme supporting flexible threshold predicate, which shares the similar efficiency with Li et al.'s work in verification [2] . In 2012, Herranz et al. [5] and Gagné et al. [6] proposed the threshold predicate ABS schemes with constant size signatures. But their schemes are both very inefficient in the signing algorithm. Recently, Li et al. [7] presented a outsourced verify protocol by using Wu et al.'s technique [8] . However, this protocol cannot resist the collusion of untrusted server and outside attacker. We specify that many existing work of ABS requires a large number of pairing computation in verification. The complexity of commonly grows linearly with the size of the predicate formula in threshold ABS. Serever-Aided Verification Signature: Employing a powerful server to assist the low power device to carried out cryptographic operations is a promising solution to reduce the computational cost, which is known as "server-aided computation". However, in practice, users are more likely to face an untrusted server which could try to extract the secret of the user or respond with a false result. To resist the untrusted server, many schemes for server-aided verification signature have been proposed in the literature. The notion was introduced by Quisquater and De Soete [10] for speeding up RSA verification with a small exponent. Lim and Lee [11] introduced this idea into discrete-logarithm based schemes, by proposing efficient protocols for speeding up the verification of discrete-logarithm based identity proofs and signatures. The server-aided verification protocol introduced by Girault and Quisquater [12] is computational secure based on the hardness of a sub-problem of the underlying complexity problem in the original signature scheme. Girault and Lefrance [13] proposed a more generalized model of server-aided verification without the assumption of [11] . Wu et al. [8] formally define the security model for capturing collusion attacks, and propose concrete server-aided verification signature schemes that are secure against such attacks. Li et al. [7] presented a outsourced verify protocol by using Wu et al.'s technique. In this paper, we will show that their protocol is not secure.
organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe some preliminaries, and review Li et al.'s ABS scheme [2] . In Section 3, we analysis Li et al.'s outsourced verify protocol [7] . In Section 4, we present the security definition of Attribute-Based Server-Aided Verification Signature. In section 5, we propose a concrete attribute-based server-aided verification protocol from Li et al.'s ABS scheme, and prove that it is secure under random oracles in Section 6. Finally, we draw conclusion in Section 7.
Preliminaries

Bilinear Mapping
Bilinear Mapping: Let G 1 and G T be two groups of prime order p and g be generator of G 1 . The map e : G 1 × G 1 → G T is said to be an admissible bilinear mapping if the following three conditions hold true: -e is bilinear, i.e., e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab for all a, b ∈ Z p . -e is non-degenerate, i.e., e(g, g) = 1 G T .
-e is efficiently computable.
We say that (G 1 , G T ) are bilinear groups if there exists the bilinear mapping e : G 1 × G 1 → G T as above, and e, and the group action of in G 1 and G T can be computed efficiently. Such groups can be built from Weil pairing or Tate pairing on elliptic curves.
Complexity Assumptions
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem(CDH):
The probability is over the uniform random choice of a, b from Z * p and over the coin tosses of A.
Attribute based Signature
An ABS scheme consists of four algorithms, namely, Setup, Extract, Sign, and Verify. Denote the universe of attributes as U . A predicate over U is a monotone boolean function, whose inputs are associated with attributes in U . We say that an attribute set Ω satisfies a predicate Υ if Υ (Ω) = 1. More precisely, all predicates Υ k,Ω * (·) :→ {0, 1} for Ω * with threshold k from 1 to d are supported, where d is a system parameter and
λ , where λ is the security parameter, this algorithm outputs public parameters params and sk as a master secret key for attribute authority; -Extract For each user's private key request on attribute set Ω, this algorithm takes as input the master secret key sk and the attribute set Ω, it outputs the user's private key sk Ω . -Sign Assume a user wants to sign a message m with a predicate Υ and a set of attributes Ω satisfying Υ k,Ω (Ω ) = 1, he takes as input his attribute private key sk Ω for attributes Ω, outputs signature σ. -Verify After receiving a signature σ on message m and attributes Ω with respect to a predicate Υ , the signature is valid if Υ k,Ω (Ω ) = 1 and the signature is valid.
Security Definition: The security definition of ABS can be divided into two items [2] . The first one is Unforgeability, which requires that the ABS scheme is existentially unforgeable against chosen predicate and message attack. The second is Attribute Signer Privacy, which means that the signature reveals noting about the identity or attributes of the signer beyond what is explicitly revealed by the claim being made.
Li et al.'s ABS scheme
In this section, we will review the ABS scheme proposed by Li et al. [2] . We define the attributes in universe U as elements in Z p , and a d − 1-element dummy attribute setΩ. Then, we define the Lagrange coefficient ∆ j,S (i) of q(j) in computation of q(i) as:
Setup Select a random generator g ∈ G 1 , a random x ∈ Z * p , and set g 1 = g x . Then, choose a random element g 2 ∈ G 1 and compute Z = e(g 1 , g 2 ). Two hash function are also chosen such that H 1 , H 2 : {0, 1} * → G 1 . Finally, output the public key P K = (g, g 1 , g 2 , Z, d, H 1 , H 2 ) and the master key M K = x. Extract For each user's private key request on the attribute set Ω, choose a d − 1 degree polynomial q(y) randomly such that q(0) = x. Then, for each i ∈ Ω ∪Ω, choose r i ∈ R Z p and compute
Sign To sign a message m with predicate Υ k,Ω * (·), namely, to prove owing at least k attributes among an n−element attribute set Ω * . Select an arbitrary
, and σ 0 = g s , with a random s ∈ . The signature is σ = (σ 0 , {σ i } i∈Ω * ∪Ω , σ 0 ). Verify Once received the signature σ = (σ 0 , {σ i } i∈Ω * ∪Ω , σ 0 ) of the message m with threshold k for attributes Ω * ∪Ω , check if the following equation holds:
Analysis of Li et al.'s outsourced verification protocol
Recently, Li et al. proposed a outsourced verification protocol by using Wu et al.'s technique [8] for their ABS scheme, which provides a solution that verifier can verify the signature with the help of a outside server. This protocol is consisted with three algorithms: the transformation algorithm for outsourced verification Transf, the out sourced verify algorithm Verify-out, and the verify algorithm Verify, replaces the original verifying algorithm in the ABS scheme.
-Transf : Once received the signature σ = (σ 0 , {σ i } i∈Ω * ∪Ω , σ 0 ), the verifier picks a random t ∈ R Z p and computesσ 0 = g t · σ 0 . Then, it sends the transformed signature σ trans = (σ 0 , {σ i } i∈Ω * ∪Ω ,σ 0 ) to the outside server, whereσ i = σ i andσ 0 = σ 0 .
-Verify-out: When the server received the σ trans on the message m with predicate Υ k,Ω * , it computes and returns (H 2 (m),σ 0 ) .
-Verify: The verifier checks whether the equation Λ = e(g, g) t · Z holds. If it holds, output 1 which indicates the signature is indeed from some user with k attributes among Ω * . Otherwise, output 0.
This outsourced verification protocol reduces the computation load at verifier side through delivering computation to the outside server. However, if the outside server collude with an attacker, the server can utilize Verify-out to convince the verifier that an invalid signature is valid with a negligible probability. The following show the procedure of collusion attack:
1. The attacker A first sends an invalid signature σ * = (σ * 0 , {σ * i } i∈Ω * * ∪Ω , σ 0 * ) to the verifier, where Υ k,Ω * * (Ω) = 1, and Ω is the attributes set from which the private key is generated. 2. The verifier picks a random t ∈ R Z p and computesσ 0 = g t · σ * 0 . Then, it sends the transformed signature to the server S. 3. A and S are colluded, and A sends the original invalid signature σ
, and computes the correct Λ from Λ = e(g, g t ) · Z.
Finally, he sends Λ to the verifier. 5. The verifier checks Λ = e(g, g t ) · Z, and it always holds. Thus, A and S always win the game.
Security definition of ABSAVS
Syntax of ABSAVS
An attribute-based server-aided verification signature ABSAVS consists of two parts: a normal ABS scheme and a attribute-based server-aided verification protocol ABSA-Verify. The ABSA-Verify protocol is an interactive protocol between server and verifier, who only has a limited computational ability and is not able to perform all computations in signature verification alone. The ABSA-Verify protocol consists of four algorithms: ParamGen, Initially compute,Server-aided verify, Lightweight-verify, which can be defined as follows:
ParamGen This algorithm outputs the secret parameters for the receiver. Initially compute This algorithm takes as input the signature σ, and computes the transformed signatureσ. Server-aided verify The server-aided verify algorithm takes as input -the transformed signatureσ and the corresponding message m and the predicate Υ . It outputs Λ which is used by verifier to perform the lightweight verification.
Lightweight-verify The lightweight verification algorithm takes as input the server-aided verification information Λ. It outputs 1 if the original signature is deemed valid and 0 otherwise.
Obviously, Li et al.'s outsourced verification protocol [7] is exactly a ABSAVerify protocol.
Completeness of ABSA-Verify protocol. An honest server can correctly convince the verifier about the validness (or invalidness) of an attribute-based signature. That is, ABSA-Verify(Server, V erif ier) = Verify(·).
Security definition of ABSAVS
In this section, we will define the security of attribute-based server-aided verification signature (ABSAVS) against the collusion between the server and the attacker who impersonates a valid signer. If we allow the server and the attacker to collude, the server will have original signatures (valid or invalid) of any messages. Thus, it is impossible to give a unified security definition to capture both existentially unforgeable ABS and soundness-ABSA-Verify simultaneously. With this in mind, we now define the security of ABSA-Verify protocol against collusion and adaptive chosen predicate attacks.
Setup. The challenger C runs the algorithm Setup in ABS scheme to obtain the public parameters params and the master secret key sk. The attacker is given params. Queries. The attacker A can perform a polynomially bounded number of queries on attribute set Ω, and C answers the corresponding private key sk Ω to A with the master secret key sk. Since A has sk Ω , he doesn't need to make the signing queries. A only needs to make the Attributed-Based ServerAided Verification Queries for a polynomially bounded times. For each query, the challenger C responds by executing ABSA-Verify protocol with A, where A acts as Server and C acts as Verifier. At the end of each executing, the challenger returns the output of ABSA-Verify protocol to A. Output. The attacker A finally outputs a signature (m * , σ * ) with a predicate Υ * , where no attribute set Ω * such that there exist Ω ⊂ Ω * satisfying Υ * (Ω) = 1 has been submitted to the private key extraction queries. σ * is considered to be a randomly invalid signature with respect to Υ * . We say A wins the game if ABSA-Verify(A, C) = V alid.
We define ABSA-Verify−Adv A to be the probability that A wins the above game, taken over the coin tosses made by A and challenger. Definition 1. An attacker A is said to (t, q v , ε)-break the soundness of ABSAVerify in a ABSAVS if A runs in time at most t, make at most q v attributedbased server-aided verification queries and ABSA-Verify − Adv A is at least ε. The ABSA-Verify in a ABSAVS is (t, q v , ε)-sound against collusion and adaptive chosen predicate attacks if there no attacker that (t, q v , ε) -breaks it.
ABSAVS scheme based on Li et al.'s ABS scheme
In this section, we construct a ABSAVS scheme based on Li et al.'s ABS scheme [2] , which is secure against collusion and adaptive chosen predicate attacks. The proposed ABSAVS scheme consists of Li et al.'s ABS scheme and a ABSAVerify protocol. We define the ABSA-Verify protocol as follows:
ParamGen The verifier randomly chooses a ∈ Z * p , where p = |G 1 |. Let |Ω * ∪ Ω | = n, the verifier randomly selects a n − 1-degree polynomial f (x) and f (0) = a. Then, verifier randomly chooses r 1 , · · · , r n ∈ Z p . The verifier keeps these parameters secretly. Initially compute when the verifier received the signature σ = (σ 0 , {σ i } i∈Ω * ∪Ω , σ 0 ) of message m, he chooses a special element θ ∈ Ω * ∪Ω , and computeŝ
Finally, the verifier sends the transformed signatureσ = (σ 0 , {σ i } i∈Ω * ∪Ω , σ 0 ) with message m to the server. Server-aided verify The server computes
, and returns it to the verifier. Lightweight-verify The verifier computes V = e(g, g 2 ) a and
and checks whether Λ · W = V · Z holds, where Z = e(g 1 , g 2 ) is defined in Li et al.'s ABS scheme. If holds, then the signature is valid, and invalid, otherwise.
Efficiency Analysis The proposed ABSA-Verify protocol reduces the computation load at verifier side through delivering computation to server but only two pairings locally. Moveover, V and W can be pre-computed offline by the verifier. In the original Li et al.'s ABS scheme, it needs |Ω * ∪Ω | + 2 pairings in verification. Compared with the original scheme. the verifier's computational overhead is greatly decreased in our scheme.
Security Analysis
According to the Lagrange Polynomial i∈Ω * ∪Ω (g
the correctness of verification is justified by the following equation:
If the server is untrustworthy, it want to utilize Server-aided verify to convince the verifier that an invalid signature is valid in a negligible probability. However, it cannot be successful in our protocol, since the verifier will choose a random a at first, and hide it in the signature by Lagrange Polynomial. That is,
Since the server has no knowledge of r 1 , · · · , r n ∈ Z p , it cannot get a or e(g, g 2 ) a from (σ 0 , {σ i } i∈Ω * ∪Ω , σ 0 ). Thus, the server cannot make an invalid signature to be valid.
If the server can collude with the attacker, who impersonates a signer, it can not only receive the transformed signatureσ = (σ 0 , {σ i } i∈Ω * ∪Ω , σ 0 ), but also obtain the original signature σ = (σ 0 , {σ i } i∈Ω * ∪Ω , σ 0 ) from the attacker. Thus, the server can get µ = i∈Ω * ∪Ω ,i =θ (g
and
However, the server still cannot re-construct e(g, g 2 ) a from µ and ν i by using Lagrange Polynomial, since it is lack of (g
in µ. Thus, the server also cannot make an invalid signature be valid.
Security Proof
In this section, we provide a security proof to our ABSAVS scheme in the random oracle by using Li et al.'s technique [7] . Proof. Assume that an attacker A has a non-negligible probability in breaking our ABSAVS scheme in sense of collusion and selective predicate, we attempt to build a challenger C that utilize A as sub-algorithm to solve the CDH problem with a non-negligible probability. Suppose the challenger C is given an instance of CDH problem g, X = g x and Y = g y where x, y ∈ R Z p and asked to compute g xy . We proceed the simulation as follows:
Init. C runs A, and receives a challenge predicate Υ k,Ω * . Setup. Let the dummy attribute denote asΩ. C selects a subsetΩ ⊆Ω with |Ω | = d − k. C randomly chooses x 1 ∈ R Z p and sends g 1 = X/(g x1 ) and g 2 = Y to A. Queries. C initialize an integer j = 0, two empty table L 1 and L 2 , and an empty set U . A is allowed to issue queries as follows. H 1 query: The attacker A can make at most q H1 queries to hash function H 1 . C maintains a list L 1 to store the answers to hash oracle H 1 . Then, upon receiving the query i, C checks L 1 , and if an entry for i is exist, then the same answer will be returned. Otherwise, C computes:
where α i , β i ∈ R Z p , and answers with H 1 (i). Then, C adds (i, H 1 (i)) to L 1 . H 2 query: Suppose A can make at most q H2 queries to hash oracle H 2 , and C maintains a list L 2 to store the answers. Then, upon receiving the j-th time H 2 -query on message m j for 1 ≤ j ≤ q H2 . C checks on the list L 2 . If an entry for the query is exist, then the same answer will be returned. Otherwise, C returns H 2 (m j ) = g β j , where
Private key query We suppose that A can make at most q k private key extract queries. When receiving an private key request on attribute set Ω, if Υ k,Ω * (Ω) = 1, then C outputs failure, otherwise, C sets j + 1 and attempts to perform simulation as follows. C defines two sets with
. The Lagrange Polynomial q(i) = j∈Γ q(j)∆ j,Γ ∪0 (i) + q(0)∆ 0,Γ ∪0 (i) is behind the above assignments. The challenger C is implicitly selecting a random d − 1-degree polynomial q(x) by choosing its values for the d − 1 points as q(i) = γ i , and q(0) = x − x 1 . Finally, after updating the entry j, Ω, ·, P Key in L where the private key P Key = {d i0 , d i1 } i∈Ω∪Ω , C returns P Key to A. Server-aided verification query The attacker only needs to make q v serveraided verification queries adaptively. For each queries (m, σ), the challenger C responds by executing ABSA-Verify protocol with the attacker A, where A acts as Server and C acts as V erif ier. At the end of each execution, the challenger returns the output of ABSA-Verify protocol to A. Output. A outputs a forged signature σ * on message m * with Υ k,ω * , where no attribute set ω * such that there exists ω ⊆ ω * satisfying Υ * (ω) = 1 has been submitted to the private key extract oracle. If H 2 (m * ) = g β δ , where δ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , q H2 }, then C will aborts. Otherwise, if this forged signature can be verified by the ABSA-Verify protocol, then it can be simulated as follows.
1. In the first place, A submits the forged signature σ * = (σ * 0 , {σ * i } i∈ω∪ω , σ * 0 ) to C. 2. Secondly, C who acts as V erif ier chooses a n − 1-degree polynomial f (x) and f (0) = x 1 and a special element θ ∈ ω * ∪ω . C computes the transformed signatureσ * = (σ * 0 , {σ * i } i∈ω∪ω , σ * 0 ), and returns it to A who acts as Server. H 1 (θ) r θ ) ∆ θ,ω * ∪ω (0) , g) = e(g, g 2 ) x1 · e(g 1 , g 2 ) = e(g x1 , g 2 ) · e(X/g x1 , g 2 ) = e(X, Y ) = e(g, g xy ).
That is,
· e((g f (θ) 2 g β θ r θ ) ∆ θ,ω * ∪ω (0) , g) = e(X, Y ) = e(g, g xy )
Then, C can compute
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a new cryptographic notion of attribute-based serveraided verification signature (ABSAVS), in which the verifier can verify an attribute based signature with the assistance of an external server. This system may be very suitable for the resource limited devices. We analysis Li et al.'s outsourced verification protocol, and show that it can be forged by collusion between untrusted server and outside attacker. We propose a formal security definition of ABSAVS, and design a concrete ABSAVS scheme from Li et al.'s ABS scheme. Our scheme can resist the collusion attack, and we give a security proof in the random oracle. However, in addition to two pairings, it still needs one multi-exponentiation and one exponentiation for the verifier in our ABSAVS scheme, and how to further reduce the computational cost in the verifier's side is our future work.
